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Commercial Law
by James C. MarshaIl
Georgia legislation concerning perfection of security interests, federal
bankruptcy amendments, and a decision by the United States Supreme
Court were the most significant developments in Georgia commercial law
during the survey period.
I. REALIZING UPON REAL PROPERTY COLLATERAL
Georgia creditors secured by real property typically enjoy a power of
sale contained within a deed to secure debt granted by the debtor.1
This power permits the creditor to conduct a nonjudicial foreclosure sale
of the collateral upon the debtor's default.2 If the proceeds of such a
sale, do not satisfy the debt, the Georgia creditor typically seeks to collect
the deficiency by foreclosing upon additional collateral, if any, or by
obtaining an in personam deficiency judgment against the debtor.
Before obtaining a deficiency judgment, however, the creditor must first
file a petition for confirmation with the local superior court.3 The court
receiving such a petition will "confirm" the foreclosure sale if it concludes
the sale was regularly conducted4 and the price received reflected the
property's "true market value."'
If the court refuses to confirm the
* Professor of Law, Walter F. George School of Law, Mercer University. Princeton
University (A.B., 1972); Boston University (J.D., 1977). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1. See O.C.G.A. §§ 44-14-161 to -165 (1982).
2. Although this foreclosure sale is conducted without judicial assistance, the creditor
essentially must use the same process as would be employed in a judicial sale. See Id.
§ 44-14-162 (1982); Id. §§ 9-13-140 to -178 (1982 & Supp. 1994).
3. The petition for confirmation must be filed within 30 days of the sale. Id. § 44-14161(a).
4. In general, the creditor must advertise the sale, including a description of the
property, in an appropriate local newspaper at least once a week for the four weeks
preceding the sale. Id § 9-13-140. Unless a court orders otherwise, the creditor must hold
the sale "by public outcry" at the county courthouse on the first Tuesday of the month
between the hours of 10:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m. Id. § 9-13-161.
5. Id. § 44-13-161(b),(c). The burden of proving the property brought true market value
is on the creditor. See Wheeler v. Coastal Bank, 182 Ga. App. 112, 354 S.E.2d 694 (1987),
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sale, the court may permit a resale, essentially restarting the foreclosure
process.6 If the court does not confirm and does not permit a resale, the
creditor loses any right to collect an in personam deficiency judgment.7
The survey period produced interesting decisions concerning the
debtor's entitlement to notice of confirmation hearings,' the necessity for
obtaining confirmation when the creditor holds multiple notes,' the
effect of bankruptcy upon the confirmation process,"0 and the timing of
collateral valuation when the court permits a resale after refusing to
confirm." These confirmation developments, however, pale in comparison to the significance of the decision of the United States Supreme
Court in BFP v. Resolution Trust Corporation."
The Demise of the Rule in Durrett
If a nonjudicial foreclosure of real property under power of sale
satisfies the creditor's debt, confirmation is unnecessary since no
deficiency remains for collection. Assuming it is regularly conducted,
Georgia law provides that such a foreclosure sale is final and may be set
Gross
aside only if tainted by fraud or procedural irregularity."
not
provide
does
sale
evidently
inadequacy of the price received at the
grounds under Georgia law for avoiding a regularly conducted, nonfraudulent foreclosure sale.' 4 But, until the decision in BFP, regularly
conducted foreclosure sales that were not fraudulent under Georgia law
could be avoided under federal law if the debtor filed bankruptcy within
one year of the date the sale became binding against a subsequent bona
fide purchaser for value.'" Following the lead of the Fifth Circuit with
its decision in Durrett v. Washington National Insurance Co., 6 many

A.

and Thompson v. Maslia, 127 Ga. App. 758, 195 S.E.2d 238 (1972).
6. O.C.G.A. § 44-14-161(c) (1982). The court has substantial discretion concerning
whether to grant resale. See Government Natl Mortgage Ass'n v. Belue, 201 Ga. App. 661,
411 S.E.2d 894 (1991).
7. O.C.G.A. § 44-14-161(a) (1992).
8. Vlass v. Security Pac. Nat'l Bank, 263 Ga. 296, 430 S.E.2d 732 (1993).
9. Ward v. Pembroke State Bank, 212 Ga. App. 322, 441 S.E.2d 691 (1994).
10. Breeze v. Columbus Bank & Trust Co., 214 Ga. App. 534, 448 S.E.2d 276 (1994);
In re Wiggins, 167 B.R. 990 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1993), affd, 167 B.R. 992 (M.D. Ga. 1994).
11. Kongv. Shearson Lehman Hutton Mortgage Corp., 211 Ga. App. 93,438 S.E.2d 132
(1993).
12.

114 S. Ct. 1757 (1994).

13. Giordano v. Stubbs, 228 Ga. 75, 79, 184 S.E.2d 165, 168 (1971).
14. Id.
15. 11 U.S.C. § 548 (1993). E.g., Grissom v. Johnson, 955 F.2d 1440 (11th Cir. 1992);
First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n of Warner Robins v. Standard Bldg. Ass'n, Ltd., 87 B.R. 22
(N.D. Ga. 1988).
16. 621 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1980).
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federal courts avoided foreclosure sales after concluding that the sale
price was not a "reasonably equivalent value" for the collateral within
the meaning of the fraudulent conveyance statute found in federal
bankruptcy law.'7 Indeed, the decision in Durrett often was cited for
the proposition that the price received at a regularly conducted, nonfraudulent foreclosure sale must equal or exceed seventy percent of the
collateral's fair market value if the sale is to withstand a timely
avoidance attack under federal bankruptcy law.
The Durrett rule may have had a chilling effect upon Georgia
foreclosure sales because, generally speaking, prospective buyers could
not be certain the sale was final until a year elapsed following recordation of their foreclosure deeds. In essence, the better the deal, the
greater the uncertainty of its survival. But it is more likely that Durrett
had a beneficial effect upon the price received at Georgia foreclosures
since, in actual practice, the price received is almost always dictated by
the wishes of the creditor conducting the foreclosure sale and not by
third party bidding.
Most creditors foreclosing upon Georgia real estate participate as
bidders in the foreclosure sales they conduct. If the creditor is concerned
about obtaining confirmation following the sale and if the local
confirmation process works as designed, the creditor is motivated to bid
more than seventy percent of the collateral's fair market value because
the creditor is concerned about proving to the superior court that the
price received was the property's "true market value.""8 But, in many
cases, the foreclosing creditor is not concerned about obtaining confirmation of a particular foreclosure sale. This could be because the sale will
satisfy the debt, or other collateral is available to satisfy the debt, or the
debtor is judgment proof, or confirmation is unnecessary under one of
the numerous exceptions created by court decision, 19 or for some other
reason. Absent a confirmation concern, the Durrett rule was the only
significant legal reason motivating foreclosing creditors in Georgia to
assure the price received upon foreclosure bore some relation to the
property's fair market value.

17. 11 U.S.C. § 548.
18. According to the decision of the Georgia Court of Appeals in Wheeler v. CoastalBank, 182 Ga. App. 112, 354 S.E.2d 694 (1987), "true market value" means the price that

would be obtained by an owner in an arm's-length transaction free of the shadow of default
and potential bankruptcy. Id. at 114, 354 S.E.2d at 696. The court held it was
inappropriate to reduce this price by anticipated expenses associated with carrying the

property and liquidating it. Id.
19. A number of these decisions are cited and discussed in Marshall, Commercial Law,
45 MERCER L. REv. 87, 92-99 (1993).
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The Supreme Court eliminated the Durrett rule with its five to four
decision in BFP.20 There, the Court held that the price received at a
regularly conducted, non-collusive2 ' foreclosure sale of real property
was conclusively presumed to be "reasonably equivalent value" in
exchange for the involuntary transfer of that property and that,
therefore, such sales could not be avoided under federal bankruptcy
law.'s Although its pronouncement specifically is limited to real
property foreclosures, BFP certainly presages the demise of the Durrett
rule for personal property foreclosures as well.'
The decision in BFP might encourage more third party bidders to
attend foreclosure sales in the hopes that the foreclosing creditor is not
concerned about confirmation and, therefore, will not be motivated to bid
"true market value." Under the regime of BFP, third party bidders
attending foreclosure sales might stumble upon a real deal that cannot
be undone so long as the sale is regularly conducted and non-collusive.
Thus, the decision in BFP may heighten third party interest in
foreclosure sales and, in that sense, promote the bidding process rather
than chill it. But, perhaps in a more important sense, the decision in
BFP may chill bidding by eliminating a substantial motivation for the
foreclosing Georgia creditor to obtain a price commensurate with fair
market value, a price that is not a real deal for the buyer. After all,
chilling the bidding is problematic only if it results in lower prices.
It is quite unlikely that Congress will overrule the decision in BFP,
and consequently, states must determine whether they wish to fill the
gap left by the demise of Durrett. Of course, Durrett can be viewed as
a relatively recent, insulting, and unnecessary infringement upon states'
rights. State lawmakers holding such views are likely to herald
Durrett'sdemise and are unlikely to fill any void created. For the time

20.

114 S. Ct. at 1757.

21. A collusive sale is fraudulent. No doubt the Court used the term "non-collusive"
instead of "non-fraudulent* because the question before it concerned whether the sale was
fraudulent under 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2). It would sound a bit circular for the Court to say
that a regularly conducted, non-fraudulent foreclosure sale cannot be a fraudulent
conveyance.
22. 114 S. Ct. at 1760.
23. Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia noted that title to real property is a matter
of significant local interest, and suggested that principles of comity and federalism
warranted federal deference to state lawmakers with regard to such local matters. 114 S.
Ct. at 1764-65. Consequently, with regard to personal property foreclosures, the decision
in BFP might be distinguished on the ground that the state's local interest is not as great
since personal property is mobile while real property is not. But a different result for
personal property foreclosures seems unlikely since the term "reasonably equivalent value"
would then have multiple meanings in a foreclosure setting, a result difficult to square
with the plain language or with any probable congressional intent.
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being, however, nothing like Durrett operates to constrain creditors in
Georgia, and both debtors and creditors should plan accordingly. If a
bankruptcy petition is inevitable or likely, debtors are well advised to
seek a commitment from a foreclosing creditor concerning the price it
will bid at its foreclosure sale. The debtor should consider filing its
petition before the sale if the creditor is not forthcoming concerning its
bid price or if the stated bid price is insufficient.
B. Multiple Notes and the Necessity for Confirmation
In Ward v. Pembroke State Bank,2 a creditor holding two notes
conducted a nonjudicial sale under power and did not confirm the sale.
The two notes were secured by the same tract of land under one deed to
secure debt, the second note by virtue of an "open end" or dragnet
clause.2' After purchasing the property at foreclosure by bidding the
amount of its first note, the creditor then filed suit to recover on the
second note.", The debtor defended this action with reference to the
creditor's failure to confirm,27 and the court of appeals determined that
its decision in C.K C., Inc. v. Free,2 ' was controlling. 29
In Free the court held that when notes are related and secured by the
same security deed, a creditor's failure to obtain confirmation of
foreclosure sale conducted to satisfy one note will bar any deficiency
judgment on the second note.3° The court distinguished Ward from
Clements v. Fleet Finance"'and Devin Lamplighter,Ltd. v. American
General Finance' in which the courts ruled that a creditor is not
barred from instituting a deficiency judgment after foreclosing upon a
prior note if the subsequent note is a separate debt secured by a
separate security deed. ' In Ward the court stated that the "open end"

24. 212 Ga. App. 322, 441 S.E.2d 691 (1994).
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id., 441 S.E.2d at 692.
28. 196 Ga. App. 280, 395 S.E.2d 666 (1990).
29. 212 Ga. App. at 323, 441 S.E.2d at 692.
30. 196 Ga. App. at 282, 395 S.E.2d at 668.
31. 206 Ga. App. 736, 426 S.E.2d 910 (1992).
32. 206 Ga. App. 747, 426 S.E.2d 645 (1992).
33. 212 Ga. App. at 323, 441 S.E.2d at 692. In both Devin Lamplighter and Clements,
a junior creditor acquired a senior creditor's note and deed to secure debt. In Clements, the
court observed that the junior creditor bought the senior position because it "was concerned
about its collateral position as the second mortgagee." 206 Ga. App. at 737, 426 S.E.2d at
912. The court in Devin Lamplighter gave no reason for the junior's acquisition of the
senior position in that case. Both courts concluded, however, that the two debts were
unrelated to one another despite the acquisition. Consequently, according to both courts,
confirmation of a foreclosure sale of the senior deed was not a prerequisite to a subsequent
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clause effectively, caused the second loan to merge with the first and
become one debt for purposes of foreclosure.' The court emphasized
the two notes were secured by the same deed to the same property.'
C. Timeliness of Notice to Debtor of Confirmation Hearing
In Wass v. Security Pacific National Bank,' the Supreme Court of
Georgia affirmed the constitutionality of the notice provisions in
Georgia's confirmation statute.3 7 The creditor in Wass conducted its
nonjudicial foreclosure on October 6, 1992, and reported the sale to the
superior court on October 30, 1992, well within the thirty day period
mandated by the confirmation statute.38 On December 9, 1992, the
creditor served the debtor with a copy of the confirmation application
and gave the debtor notice that the confirmation hearing was scheduled
for December 28, 1992.
The debtor found this timing and process objectionable, contending
that service of the creditor's application for confirmation must comply
with the Civil Practice Act ("CPA"). 9 But the court in Wass found the
CPA inapplicable because the confirmation process is begun by an
application, not a complaint, the application invokes only the supervisory
powers of the superior court and the confirmation process generally is
not an action of a "civil nature."' Having decided that the CPA was
inapplicable, the court then concluded the timing of notice was governed
solely by the confirmation statute.41 That statute requires only that
the debtor be personally
served at least five days prior to the date of the
42
confirmation hearing.

suit on the junior note although the foreclosure sale had been conducted by the creditor
bringing suit. Id., 426 S.E.2d at 913; 206 Ga. App. 747, 748, 426 S.E.2d 646, 647.
34. 212 Ga. App. at 323, 441 S.E.2d 692.
35. Id.
36. 263 Ga. 296, 430 S.E.2d 732 (1993).
37. Id. at 298-99. See O.C.G.A. 0 44-14-160 to -303 (1982).
38. See O.C.G.A. § 44-14-161 (a).
39. O.C.G.A. §§ 9.11-1 to -132 (1993). According to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-81, the Civil
Practice Act "shall apply to all special statutory proceedings to the extent that specific
rules of practice and procedure in conflict t]herewith are expressly prescribed by law...."
O.C.G.A. § 44-14-161 (c) provides that the superior court "shall direct that a notice of the
hearing shall be given to the debtor at least five days prior thereto...." Since O.C.G.A.
§ 44-14-161 does not expressly provide to the contrary, the debtor contended the CPA was
applicable and therefore service of the debtor's application for confirmation must be in
accordance with O.C.G.A. § 9-11-4. 263 Ga. at 296, 430 S.E.2d at 733-34.
40. 263 Ga. at 297, 430 S.E.2d at 734.
41. Id. at 297-98, 430 S.E.2d at 734.
42. Id.; O.C.G.A. § 44-14-161 (1982).
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The court in Vlass also rejected the debtor's alterriative contention
that the five day notice provision constituted an unconstitutional denial
of equal protection because other "defendants" in "civil actions" received
greater notice under the CPA.' Once again the court disagreed with
the debtor's essential premise that he was a defendant in a civil action,
and the court concluded that the confirmation statute permissibly
treated different classes differently." Unfortunately, the court also
noted that Vlass received nearly three weeks notice of the scheduled
hearing, much more than the required five days notice.' This observation invites subsequent litigants to distinguish Vlass in an attempt to
establish the confirmation statute's five day notice period unfairly
advantages the creditor and violates constitutional due process
requirements."
Certainly five days is an exceedingly brief period within which to
fairly prepare for a contested confirmation hearing since the debtor
typically should produce expert appraisal testimony concerning value.
But the debtor's substantive right to confirmation is solely a creature of
the confirmation statute. Absent very unusual circumstances, a statute
solely responsible for creating a right may prescribe and limit the
procedures protecting the right, thereby further defining the right. It
might be unwise or impolitic, but the confirmation statute constitutionally could prohibit the debtor altogether from participating in the
confirmation process, assuming such a prohibition did not run afoul of
some constitutional requirement or limitation concerning the exercise of
judicial authority. If the debtor's participation could have been
altogether prohibited by the confirmation statute, then surely the statute
constitutionally may limit the required notice to five days (or three days
or one or none, for that matter).
Of course, at least in theory if not always in practice, whenever a
nonjudicial foreclosure of real property collateral fails to satisfy an
obligation for which a deficiency judgment might be sought by the
creditor, the debtor is on notice from the time of sale that the creditor
may seek to confirm the sale that any confirmation proceeding will
involve several limited issues and that the notice of a confirmation
hearing could be as short as five days. In most instances in which the
debtor is capable of effectively participating in the confirmation hearing,
the debtor also is capable of preparing (and should prepare) well in
advance of receiving formal notice. At the very least, the debtor should

43.
44.
45.
46.

263 Ga. at 298, 430 S.E.2d at 735.
Id.
Id.
Id.

102
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monitor the filing of any confirmation application through contact with
the creditor or the creditor's counsel or the applicable superior court.
Creditors, on the other hand, should weigh the potential tactical
advantages of keeping formal notice to a minimum, while remembering
that it is within the discretion of the superior court to grant a continuance upon the request of a debtor needing more time to fairly prepare for
a confirmation hearing.
Finally, since the court in W/ass concluded that the Civil Practice Act
is inapplicable to confirmation proceedings and further stated that those
proceedings merely invoke the supervisory authority of the superior
courts, presumably the superior courts are left with the supervisory
discretion and burden to determine the appropriate procedures to be
followed in confirmation proceedings.47 The superior court's discretion,
to establish and enforce appropriate procedures evidently is limited only
by the specific and minimal procedural commands of the confirmation
statute and by minimal due process requirements imposed by the federal
and state constitutions. As a result, the procedural practice in
confirmation proceedings can vary widely from court to court.
Perhaps the Council of Superior Court Judges of Georgia' should
propose the adoption of uniform rules governing confirmation proceedings. ' To avoid the "trial by ambush" problem with confirmation
hearings, any uniform rules should, at a minimum, enable creditors to
obtain from debtors timely admissions or denials of the allegations in an
application for confirmation. The rules also should give both sides an
opportunity to conduct some discovery prior to the hearing, including an
opportunity to timely review and copy all appraisals and depose all
valuation witnesses. So long as the rules of practice before a particular
court remain unclear and the opposing counsel or party is uncooperative,
counsel participating in confirmation proceedings should consider asking
the superior court to exercise its supervisory discretion by imposing
appropriate discovery requirements in advance of the confirmation
hearing.

47. Id.
48. The council is established by O.C.G.A. § 15-6-34 and is composed of "the judges,
senior judges, and judges emeriti of the superior courts of [Georgia]." O.C.G.A. § 15-6-34
(1994).
49. Art. 6, Sec. 9, Par. 1 of the Georgia Constitution provides that the Supreme Court
of Georgia "shall, with the advice and consent of the council of the affected class or classes
of trial courts, by order adopt and publish uniform court rules... for the... resolution of
disputes."
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D. The Effect of Bankruptcy upon Confirmation Proceedings
In Breeze v. Columbus Bank & Trust Co.,' a creditor obtained relief
from the automatic stay and conducted a foreclosure sale on May 3, 1993
while the debtor's bankruptcy proceeding was still pending."1 The
debtor's bankruptcy proceeding was dismissed on August 20, 1993, and
the creditor began its confirmation process on August 31, 1993.2 The
superior court confirmed the sale, and the debtor appealed, contending
confirmation was not authorized because more than thirty days elapsed
before the creditor reported the sale to the bankruptcy court.' The
court of appeals rejected this contention and held that the debtor's
pending bankruptcy tolled the thirty-day time period for reporting
foreclosures under a power of sale."
By bringing its confirmation proceeding, the creditor in Breeze was
attempting to protect its right to obtain a deficiency judgment and,
ultimately, to satisfy its deficiency through judicial execution against the
debtor's non-exempt assets and income. This collection avenue must be
distinguished from the creditor's right to assert a deficiency claim in the
50. 214 Ga. App. 534, 448 S.E.2d 276 (1994).
51. Id. at 534, 448 S.E.2d at 277.
52. Id.
53. Id. O.C.G.A. § 44-14-161 requires a creditor to report any non-judicial foreclosure
sale within 30 days for confirmation by a superior court.
54. Id. The court relied upon Bankruptcy Code section 108(c), 11 U.S.C. 108(c), which
provides as follows:
(c) ... [I1f applicable nonbankruptcy law ... fixes a period for commencing or
continuing a civil action in a court other than a bankruptcy court on a claim
against the debtor [or an individual protected by the co-debtor stay found in
chapters 12 and 13 of the Bankruptcy Code] and such period has not expired
before the date of the filing of the petition, then such period does not expire until
the later of (1) the end ofsuch period, including any suspension of such period occurring
on or after the commencement of the case; or
(2) 30 days after notice of the termination or expiration of the stay under
§ 362, 922, 1201, or 1301 of this title, as the case may be, with respect to such
claim.
Particularly in light of the opinion of the Georgia Supreme Court in Wass, cited and
discussed supra notes 35 through 48 and accompanying text, it is arguable that the tolling
provisions ofBankruptcy Code section 108(c) should not apply to a confirmation proceeding
because such a proceeding is not a "civil action7 and does not involve "a claim against the
debtor" but instead involves the supervisory power of superior courts to monitor nonjudicial
foreclosure sales conducted within their counties. But federal law provides the meaning
of terms in federal statutes, and it would be somewhat inconsistent for federal law to
automatically stay confirmation proceedings under Bankruptcy Code section 362,11 U.S.C.
§ 362, without also tolling the time for bringing confirmation proceedings after termination
of the bankruptcy proceeding.

104
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debtor's ongoing bankruptcy proceeding and share in distributions from
the bankruptcy estate.
Breeze did not involve a potential deficiency claim asserted against-the
assets of a bankruptcy estate. But the survey period decision in In re
Wiggins"5 did. Like Breeze, the creditor in Wiggins obtained relief from
the automatic stay, conducted a foreclosure sale, and did not confirm the
sale because the debtor remained in bankruptcy. Unlike Breeze,
however, the debtor in Wiggins ultimately obtained a discharge of his
obligation to the creditor and thereby extinguished the creditor's right
to recover the deficiency via further state court process. The creditor did
pursue its only other collection alternative by filing a proof of claim in
the bankruptcy court for the deficiency amount. The bankruptcy trustee
objected to the creditor's deficiency claim because the creditor had not
confirmed its nonjudicial foreclosure sale.'
The bankruptcy court in Wiggins sustained the trustee's objection.57
The court observed that, under Georgia law, the creditor's failure to
confirm was fatal to its right to collect a deficiency.' The court then
noted that, under federal law, a claim against a bankruptcy estate
cannot be allowed if the claim is unenforceable under any agreement or
applicable law. 9 For these two reasons, the court concluded the
creditor's deficiency claim should be disallowed."°
The bankruptcy court's decision in Wiggins was upheld by the district
court on appeal."' In its opinion, the district court specifically noted
that the creditor's motion for relief from stay "did not request permission
to have the foreclosure sale confirmed nor was this right specifically
granted [by the bankruptcy court].' 2 Of course, the result in Wiggins

55. 167 B.R. 990 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1993), affd, 167 B.R. 992 (M.D. Ga. 1994).
56. 167 B.R. at 991.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 992, citing 11 U.S.C. § 502(bX1) which provides that a claim must be
disallowed
to the extent that (1) such claim is unenforceable against the debtor and property of the debtor under
any agreement or applicable law for a reason other than because such claim is
contingent or unmatured.
Arguably, the court of appeals' decision in Breeze suggests the creditor's right to collect a
deficiency in Wiggins was unenforceable simply because it remained "contingent or
unmatured" pending confirmation. Confirmation of the Wiggins' sale still was possible
under the authority of Breeze because the 30-day period for commencing a confirmation
action had been tolled throughout the relevant time periods involved in Wiggins.
60. 167 B.R. at 992.
61. 167 B.R. 992 (M.D. Ga. 1994).
62. Id. at 993.
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would be easier to square with the tolling rule of Breeze if the creditor
in Wiggins had received permission to confirm its sale and failed to
begin the confirmation process within the thirty-day period.63 Combining Breeze and Wiggins illustrates a rule of practice currently followed
by most Georgia creditors: When seeking relief from stay in bankruptcy
to conduct a nonjudicial foreclosure on Georgia real property, always
request authorization to confirm the anticipated sale unless it clearly is
pointless to preserve a deficiency claim against the debtor or the debtor's
bankruptcy estate.
On a final note, it is interesting to speculate about the impact of the
decision in Wiggins upon the "eat dirt" plans now in vogue in Chapter
11 bankruptcies. Such a plan abandons collateral to a secured creditor
in partial or complete satisfaction of the creditor's claim.' The extent
to which the creditor's total claim is satisfied, however, depends upon
the value placed upon the collateral by the bankruptcy court. Courts
generally give collateral a fair market value if the debtor proposes to
retain it. But when the debtor proposes to abandon the collateral to the
creditor in an "eat dirt" plan, both the applicable bankruptcy statute and
the developing bankruptcy case law suggests the bankruptcy court
should deduct the creditor's anticipated holding period costs, resale
expenses, and, perhaps, the time value of money for the anticipated
duration of the holding period.65 This contrasts markedly with Georgia
decisions defining "true market value" for purposes of the confirmation
statute.' If Wiggins is authority that confirmation is required before a
deficiency claim may be allowed and if confirmation would be denied
unless a nonjudicial foreclosure brought "true market value," should not
the "eat dirt" valuation be "true market value" as defined by Georgia
law? Is it relevant that Georgia law permits a creditor to easily
circumvent the confirmation process by simply obtaining judgment on
the underlying obligation before conducting a nonjudicial foreclosure?

63. See supra note 55.
64. The seminal decision is in In re Matter of Sandy Ridge Development Corp., 881
F.2d 1346 (5th Cir. 1989).

65. The Bankruptcy Code instructs that value of collateral is to "be determined in light
of the purpose of the valuation and of the proposed disposition or use of such property."
11 U.S.C. § 506(a). For opinions discussing the appropriate deductions from fair market
value, see In re Spacek, 112 B.R. 162 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1990); In re Peerman, 109 B.R, 718
(Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1989).
66.

For a description of the meaning of the phrase "true market value," see supra note
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E. Date for Determining Value Upon Resale
In Kong v. Shearson Lehman Hutton Mortgage Corp., the superior
court denied confirmation of the creditor's initial foreclosure sale but did
permit the creditor to resell." The creditor then resold the collateral
for a slightly higher price, and upon confirmation, the superior court
concluded that this higher price did represent the property's "true
market value" as of the date of the second sale. 9 On appeal, the debtor
challenged this choice of dates for determining value.7" In essence, the
debtor contended the property had declined in value between. the two
sales and "true market value" should be determined as of the date of the
first sale because the necessity for resale had been occasioned by the
creditor's initial failure to comply with the dictates of the confirmation
statute." Presumably the debtor would not have taken this view if the
property had appreciated in value, but instead would argue for use of
the second date on the theory that the creditor should not be permitted
to benefit from its wrongful failure to meet its foreclosure responsibilities.
As it has so often in recent years, the court of appeals in Kong
emphasized that the confirmation statute is in derogation of the common
law and must be strictly construed.72 The court ruled that "true
market value" is to be determined as of the date of the sale sought to be
confirmed, not the date of a prior sale.' 3 In part, the court justified its
decision with the rather remarkable observation that the debtors were
themselves somewhat responsible for the decline in value because they
successfully challenged the creditor's initial confirmation request. 74
Suppose the debtors had not participated in the original confirmation
process and the superior court nevertheless did its duty and denied
confirmation. No doubt the court in Kong would have reached the same
result. So the court's observation about the debtors' culpability should
be read merely as an ad terrorum warning to debtors contemplating a
confirmation challenge in a declining market or in any setting in which
the value of the collateral could decline for any reason. Frankly, in light
of the decision in Kong, debtors successfully challenging confirmation

67. 211 Ga. App. 93, 438 S.E.2d 132 (1993).
68. Id. at 94, 438 S.E.2d at 133.
69. Id. at 94-95, 438 S.E.2d at 133.

70. Id. at 95, 438 S.E.2d at 133.
71. Id.
72.

Id.

73. Id., 438 S.E.2d at 133-34.
74. Id. at 96, 438 S.E.2d at 134.
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should consider requesting that the superior court condition any grant
of authority to resell upon some appropriate concessions by the creditor
concerning risk of loss. Obtaining such a concession from a petitioning
creditor arguably is within the broad discretion of the superior court in
considering the creditor's request that it be permitted to resell.
F Attorney Fees Percentage Calculated on Total Debt, Not Merely
ForeclosureDeficiency
The decision of the court of appeals in Kenemer v. FirstNationalBank
of Atlanta75 confirms the common understanding that the attorney fees
percentages detailed in Official Code of Georgia Annotated ("O.C.G.A.")
section 13-1-1176 apply to the entire debt, not merely the deficiency
remaining after the creditor conducts a foreclosure sale "by and through"
its attorney.7 7 The court in Kenemer distinguished the decision in
David v. ITT Diversified Credit Corp.,78 because in David a portion of
the debt was satisfied by a longstanding repurchase agreement and,
therefore, was not collected by and through an attorney.79 By negative
implication from the court's discussion in Kenemer, a creditor that
advertises and conducts its own foreclosure sale will not be entitled to
charge the attorney fees percentage against the portion of the debt
satisfied by the sale proceeds although the deficiency following the sale
might be collected "by and through" an attorney. What happens in the
unlikely case in which the attorney sends the acceleration and demand
letter but does not participate in the foreclosure process?
11.

MISCELLANEOUS

Central Filingfor FinancingStatements
Georgia legislation enacted piecemeal in 1993 and 1994, and fully
effective as of January 1, 1995, established a central filing system for
financing statements under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code
(U.C.C.). s The new system is the product of much labor by members
of the Uniform Commercial Code Committee of the Corporate and
Banking Law Section of the State Bar of Georgia, particularly A. H.
Conrad, Jr. and Richard P. Kessler, Jr. These gentlemen and others

A.

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

210 Ga. App. 389, 436 S.E.2d 96 (1993).
O.C.G. § 13-1-11 (1982).
210 Ga. App. at 387-90, 436 S.E.2d at 97.
174 Ga. App. 910, 332 S.E.2d 8 (1985).
210 Ga. App. at 390, 436 S.E.2d at 97.
O.C.G.A. § 11-9-401 to -409 (1994).
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already have written extensively concerning the new system"l so this
Article will offer only a brief summary of its provisions.
Under the new central filing system, financing statements are effective
if filed in any county in Georgia regardless of the location of the debtor's
residence or place of business or the location of the collateral.8 2 In
addition, to fully perfect rights in certain real estate related collateral,
notice of the U.C.C. filing must be made in the appropriate county's real
property records." Beginning July 1, 1994, the filing of a financing
statement is required to perfect rights in fixtures." All filings under
the new system must include the debtor's social security number or
taxpayer identification number or a statement that the debtor is not
required to have such a number." Errors concerning this information
will not affect priority, however, unless the competing party can prove
the secured party "failed to make a good faith effort to obtain an
accurate number from the debtor."' The secured party may rely upon
the debtor's written acknowledgement concerning the accuracy of this
information, and the debtor's signature on a "financing statement or
information is deemed to be a written
amendment which includes such"
87
acknowledgement by the debtor.

The new system will simplify and speed U.C.C. lien searches and
should greatly alleviate a perfection problem that has plagued Georgia

81. See, e.g.,, Kessler and Jordan, Uniform Commercial Code New Georgia Central
Indexing and Local Filing System, Paper Prepared for Secured Lending Seminar conducted
by the Institute of Continuing Legal Education in Georgia (September 16,1994); Null, UCC

Update-Centralized Filing of Financing Statements in Georgia and Other Recent
Developments, Material Prepared for Real Property Institute conducted by the Institute

of Continuing Legal Education in Georgia (May 12-14, 1994); Conrad, Georgia's New
Financing Statement Filing and Central Indexing System: An Outline for Supplemental
Legislation in 1994, Materials Prepared for Secured Lending Seminar conducted by the
Institute of Continuing Legal Education in Georgia (September 17, 1993); Harper, New
Georgia UCC Article 9 Amendments-Central Indexing and Local Filing, an Introduction

to the Central Indexing System, Material Prepared for Secured Lending Seminar conducted
by the Institute of Continuing Legal Education in Georgia (September 17, 1993); Kessler,
New UCC Article 9 Transition Rules, Material Prepared for Secured Lending Seminar
conducted by the Institute for Continuing Legal Education in Georgia (September 17,
1993); Jordan, Creation and Perfection of Security Interests in Personal Property under
Georgia's UCC Article 9 and Newly-Revised UCC Article 8, Materials Prepared for Secured
Lending Seminar conducted by the Institute of Continuing Legal Education in Georgia
(September 17, 1992).
82. O.C.G.A. § 11-9401 (1994).

83. Id. § 11-9-403 (4).
84. Id. § 11-9-402 (6).
85. Id. § 11-9-409.
86. Id.
87. Id.
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lenders for decades: filing in the wrong location. Once the system is
running and debugged, Georgia law concerning the perfection of other
liens should be amended to include filing in the central system.
Judgment liens should be the first candidate for inclusion.
B. Alleged Breached of Commitment Letter; No Duty of Good Faith
The survey period opinion of a panel of the court of appeals in Lake
7ghtsqueeze, Inc. u. Chrysler First Financial Services Corp,' is a
reminder that Georgia remains an inhospitable forum for lender liability
claims. Lake 71ghtsqueeze involved an appeal from the trial court's
grant of summary judgment to a lender in a suit by a borrower8 9 who
alleged, in essence, that the lender breached a written loan commitment.
Resolving disputed facts in the borrower's favor produces a compelling
story," The lender's commitment evidently was made in connection
with an initial loan to the borrower to be used for the development of a
subdivision. By letter to the borrower, one of the lender's branch
managers apparently indicated the lender would provide future
financing to creditworthy purchasers of lots in the new subdivision
provided several conditions were satisfied. This letter evidently did not
detail proposed financing terms with any specificity, but no doubt the
borrower's principal testified on deposition that he understood the
lender's commitment to mean the lender would evaluate in good faith
any credit applications submitted by prospective purchasers and would
make loans to prospective purchasers' upon its ordinary lending terms
for the particular type of collateral provided the purchaser met the
lender's ordinary requirements for creditworthiness.9 1
Unfortunately, when the borrower's principal later inquired about the
promised financing, he was told the lender "no longer loaned money on
individual real estate lots but was focusing on credit purchases for small
retail items at that time." 2 The borrower never presented the lender
with any credit applications from proposed purchasers, an act that
surely wold be futile in light of the lender's statement that it was no
longer in the business of real estate finance. The borrower defaulted on
the initial loan and sued the lender for breach of contract, fraud, breach

88. 210 Ga. App. 178, 435 S.E.2d 486 (1993).
89. Actually, both the borrower, Lake Tightsqueeze, Inc., and a guarantor filed suit,
perhaps as a preemptory strike because of a default on an existing note with Chrysler. In
the interest of clarity and economy, this Article omits further reference to the guarantor.
90. The court of appeals' summary mentions many facts that arguably are irrelevant
to the grant of summary judgment.
91. 210 Ga. App. at 178-79, 435 S.E.2d at 487.
92. Id. at 179, 435 S.E.2d at 487.
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of the duty of good faith, negligent misrepresentation, reckless misrepresentation, and intentional misrepresentation." The lender counterclaimed on the note, and the trial court granted summary judgment to
the lender on all claims."
The court of appeals summarily disposed of each of the borrower's
lender liability theories." The court first opined that the lender's
written commitment concerning future financing was not an enforceable
contract since it did not specify all terms and conditions." According
to the court, the lender had merely agreed to future negotiations.0
Furthermore, the court determined that, even if the letter was a
contract, it was not enforceable until the specified preconditions were
met.98 Having already concluded there was no binding written
contract, the court also found that the borrower could not succeed on its
promissory estoppel claim because "the record is devoid of any promises
made [by the lender]."' The court similarly discarded the borrower's
claims of negligent, reckless and intentional misrepresentation,
concluding that the borrower had "not shown that and misrepresentations [had] been made."1" The court stated that the implied duty of
good faith under the U.C.C. is only applicable to the sale of goods and
does not apply to the financing of real estate lots." 1 Assuming for the
sake of argument that a duty of good faith did exist, however, the court
then ruled that "the failure to act in good faith in the performance of
contracts or duties under the Uniform Commercial Code does not state
an independent claim for which relief may be granted."1"
The court's discussion of good faith in Lake Tightsqueeze is somewhat
misleading and incomplete. The court rejected the borrower's argument
that the lender breached an implied duty of good faith under the
Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) by simply stating that the U.C.C. did
not apply to the alleged contract at issue since the contract involved the

93. Id. at 178, 435 S.E.2d at 486.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 179, 435 S.E.2d at 488.
97. Id.
98. Id. The court ignored altogether the possibility that the borrower's failure to meet
the required conditions merely was a natural response to the lender's anticipatory
repudiation of the letter agreement. Borrower's faced with circumstances similar to Lake
Tightsqueeze would be well advised to tender performance rather than risk relying upon
an argument that such a tender would have been futile.
99. Id. at 180, 435 S.E.2d at 488.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 181, 435 S.E.2d at 488.
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sale of real property, not personal property. 108 If the U.C.C. did apply,
its relevant provision states that "[elvery contract or duty within this Act
imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance or enforcement."'0 4 But if the U.C.C. does not apply, then Georgia contract law
essentially provides that every contract imposes upon each party a duty
of good faith and fair dealing in its performance or enforcement.0 5
Under Georgia law, parties to contracts must act in good faith regardless
of whether the
contract is governed by the U.C.C. or by the general law
°
of contracts.

0

Surely the borrower's miscitation to the U.C.C. does not explain the
court's rejection of the borrower's good faith count in Lake Tightsqueeze.
The absence of a loan agreement enforceable under Georgia law is (or
should have been) the critical assumption underlying the court's
discussion of good faith. The court's opinion should be read as authority
that the obligation of good faith does not extend to contract formation,
as distinguished from contract performance or enforcement. So read, the
opinion in Lake Tightsqueeze states a familiar proposition of Georgia

law.107

103. Id. at 180-81, 435 S.E.2d at 488.
104. O.C.G.A. § 11-1-203 (1994).
105. See generally Jackson Elec. Membership Corp. v. Georgia Power Co., 257 Ga. 772,
364 S.E.2d 556 (1988).
106. This assumes, of course, that the contract has not permissibly negated the duty.
In Automatic Sprinkler Corp. of Am. v. Anderson, 243 Ga. 867, 868, 257 S.E.2d 283, 284,
the Georgia Supreme Court stated that "it is possible to so draw a contract as to leave
decisions absolutely to the uncontrolled discretion of one of the parties and in such a case
the issue of good faith is irrelevant." Id.
107. Commitments to lend money are not enforceable in Georgia without a writing.
O.C.G.A. § 13-5-30 (Supp. 1994).
Although fraud can be predicated on a misrepresentation as to a future event where
the defendant knows that the future event will not take place, fraud cannot be
predicated on a promise which is unenforceable at the time it is made. A promise to
make a loan with no specification of the interest rate or maturity date is not
enforceable and will not support an action for fraud.
Beasley v. Ponder, 143 Ga. App. 810,240 S.E.2d 111 (1977). Although, generally speaking,
an allegation of fraudulent inducement circumvents the parol evidence rule in Georgia,
Georgia cases are particularly hostile to such allegations of fraud based upon alleged oral
assurances and promises made by bank officers. First Natl Bank & Trust Co. v.
Thompson, 240 Ga. 494, 241 S.E.2d 253 (1978). The reasons for this hostility are clearly
illustrated in the opinion of the Supreme Court of Kansas in Stevens v. Inch, 98 Kan. 306,
308, 158 Pac. 43, 44 (1916), a case in which the maker of a note attempted to avoid
enforcement by stating that he had received inconsistent oral assurances concerning his
obligations.
It does not help the defense to call the statements and promises of Stevens fraudulent.
The books teem with cases involving oral promises that notes need not be paid, or are
mere memoranda, or will be surrendered without satisfaction, or may be paid out of
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Waiver of Jury 7ials in Loan Agreements and Guaranties

In Bank South v. Howardl o' the Supreme Court of Georgia refused
to enforce a provision of a guaranty agreement that waived the right to
a jury trial in any action on the guaranty.'O° The court held that the
right to a jury trail is guaranteed by the Constitution of Georgia and can
only be waived in two circumstances: (1) when no issuable defense is
filed, and (2) when the parties do not demand a jury trial.110 O.C.G.A.
section 9-11-39(a) also allows for waiver by express stipulation either
written or made orally in open court."' The court concluded a jury
trial waiver could only be made if there is litigation actually pending."' The court in Howard specifically distinguished arbitration
clauses because the enforceability of pre-litigation arbitration agreements is established by statute.' Although the court did not specifically discuss the relationship between arbitration and jury trial waivers,
the court did cite Weyant v. MacIntyre, 4 a court of appeals case
upholding the enforceability of pre-litigation agreements to arbitrate."' Many lenders do include arbitration provisions in their loan
the profits of a business venture if successful, and need not be paid otherwise. In all
such cases the promises made to induce the maker to sign the note, and if the promise
be not kept, it works a fraud. The theory of the law is that more fraud would result
if all notes were open to qualification and contradiction by parol evidence than if the
door were closed and locked against such evidence. Consequently, to defeat liability
on a note because obtained by fraud, the fraud must consist in something else than
representations and promises of the kind referred to. Id.
In Tallman v. First Natl Bank of Nevada, 66 Nev. 248, 208 P.2d 302 (1949), the court said
If testimony as to parol understandings contrary to a written agreement were
admissible to prove fraud and if the rule does not apply where fraud is proven, quite
obviously we would have no parol evidence rule, for then, in each case evidence as to
oral understandings would be admissible to contradict a written agreement.
Id. at 258, 208 P.2d at 306-7.
108. 264 Ga. 339, 444 S.E.2d 799 (1994).
109. Id. at 340-41, 444 S.E.2d at 800.
110. Id. at 340, 444 S.E.2d at 800.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. 211 Ga. App. 281, 438 S.E.2d 640 (1993).
115. Id. Most states have upheld arbitration clauses as an effective waiver of the right
to trial by jury. See, e.g., Long v. DeGeer, 753 P.2d 1327, 1329 (Okla. 1987); Aufderhar v.
Data Dispatch, Inc., 452 N.W.2d 648,650 (Minn. 1990); Lawrence v. Wazer & Gabrielson,
207 Cal. App. 3d 1501, 1507 (1989); Family Loan Co. v. Surratt, 149 S.E.2d 334, 336 (S.C.
1966). For that matter, most states as well as the federal courts have held pre-litigation
waivers of jury trials are enforceable if made knowingly and voluntarily. See, e.g., Telum
v. E.F. Hutton Credit Corp., 859 F.2d 835, 836 (10th Cir. 1988); Leasing Serv. Corp. v.
Crane, 804 F.2d 828,832 (4th Cir. 1986); K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752,755
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documentation. More will begin to do so as a result of the decision in
Howard.
D. Recent Bankruptcy Amendments of Interest to All Commercial
Lawyers
Some of the provisions of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994 (the
"Act") should be noted by a broader audience than bankruptcy specialists."' The Act became effective October 22, 1994,7 and all of the
provisions discussed in this Article are effective with regard to cases
commenced on or after that date.
Hotel and Motel Revenues as Cash CollateraL The Act amended
Bankruptcy Code section 552(b) to expand the categories of property that
remain subject to an agreement entered into before the filing of a
bankruptcy petition even though the property was acquired by the
debtor after the bankruptcy filing.118 Those categories previously
included "proceeds, products, offspring, rents, or profits" arising from
property in which the creditor held a security interest upon the date of
filing."9 The Act deleted the term "rents" from this passage, but
added a new subsection, Bankruptcy Code section 552(b)(2), that
effectively includes not only rents but also "fees, charges, accounts, or
other payments for the use or occupancy of rooms and other public
facilities in hotels, motels, or other lodging properties... "12o Lenders
holding a prepetition interest now will enjoy a postpetition interest in
these items "except to any extent that the court, after notice and a
hearing and based on the equities of the case, orders otherwise."'

(6th Cir. 1985); Central Investment Assoc. v. Leasing Serv. Corp., 362 So. 2d 702, 704 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1978); Mall, Inc. v. Robbins, 412 So. 2d 1197, 1199 (Ala. 1982); Reggie
Packing Co. v. Lazere Fin. Corp., 671 F. Supp. 571, 573 (N.D. M11.1987); McCarthy v.
Wynne, 126 F.2d 620, 623 (10th Cir. 1942); 73 A.L.R.2d 1332 (1960).
116. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat 4106 (1994)

[hereinafter BRA].
117. BRA § 702.
118. BRA § 214.
119. Id.
120. Id. This amendment evidently resolves, or at least moots, a disagreement among
different courts concerning whether hotel and motel revenues constitute cash collateral.

See, e.g. In re Tollman-Hudley Dalton, 162 B.R. 26 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1993), compare, In re
S.F. Drake Hotel Assoc., 147 B.R. 538 (N.D. Cal. 1992). Bankruptcy Code section 363
concurrently was amended to expand the definition of cash collateral to include "the fees,
charges, accounts or other payments for the use or occupancy of rooms and other public

facilities in hotels, motels, or other lodging properties." BRA § 214.
121. Id. This exception has been used to establish that at least some portion of the
property received postpetition should be free of the creditor's security interest in
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"Bankruptcy Remote," Single Asset Real Estate Financing. In
recent years, many single asset real estate bankruptcy cases have
produced court opinions considering whether the case was filed in bad
faith or is one in which relief from the automatic stay should be granted
for cause. 22 The Bankruptcy Code now includes a definition for
"single asset real estate."123 As used in the Bankruptcy Code, that
term now
means real property constituting a single property or project, other
than residential real property with fewer than four residential units,
which generates substantially all of the gross income of a debtor and
on which no substantial business is being conducted by a debtor other
than the business of operating the real property and activities
incidental thereto having aggregate noncontingent liquidated secured
debts in an amount no more than $4 million.1"
For "single asset real estate" bankruptcy cases filed on or after October
22, 1994, the Bankruptcy Code section 362(d) adds another, independent
basis for relief from automatic stay.125 The additional ground entitles
a creditor holding a claim secured by an interest in the real estate to
relief from stay unless
(3) ... not later than... 90 days after the entry of the order for relief

(or such later date as the court may determine for cause by order
entered within that 90-day period) (A) The debtor has filed a plan of reorganization that has a
reasonable possibility of being confirmed within a reasonable time; or
(B) The debtor has commenced monthly payments to each creditor
whose claim is secured by such real estate (other than a claim secured
by a judgment lien or by an unmatured statutory lien), which
payments are in an amount equal to interest at a current fair market
rate on the value of the creditor's interest in the real estate.1

recognition of the fact that the particular property did not, or was not, acquired by the
debtor solely because of the debtor's continued possession and ownership of the creditor's

collateral. After all, cows do not produce cash, they produce milk. And they only produce
milk if they are supplied the correct mood music.
122. See In re Natural Land Corporation, 825 F.2d 296 (lth Cir. 1987); In re Albany
Partners Limited, 749 F.2d 670 (11th Cir. 1984).
123. BRA § 218.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
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The provisions of 362(d) remain disjunctive. A court may grant relief
from stay "for cause" and also grant relief from stay because the debtor
lacks equity and has no reasonable likelihood of reorganization." 7
The single asset amendments appear to make a bad faith filing
determination slightly more likely. Single asset debtors now must be
able and prepared to make the required payments within ninety
days.'i If the debtor's circumstances upon the filing date suggest no
reasonable prospect of doing so, then the filing is more likely to be in
bad faith. Immediate cash flow is now critical to the debtor.
The new single asset provision should encourage lenders to insist,
when possible, that the borrower be structured (or restructured) to fit
the definition of the single asset case. The term "Bankruptcy Remote"
is becoming a common requirement in real estate loan commitments.
Warning- File Continuation Statements and Take Other Action
to Maintain Perfection. The filing of a petition in bankruptcy
automatically stays many acts that might otherwise have been taken
Because of this, most
against the debtor or the debtor's property.'
Georgia secured creditors do not file continuaiton statements or take
other actions to maintain perfection when a bankruptcy is pending. For
bankruptcy cases filed on or after October 22, 1994, the automatic stay
no longer prohibits most of these actions, and Bankruptcy Code section
546(b) specifically permits them.'

127. Id.
128. BRA § 218.
129. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1994).
130. Section 546(b) now provides:
(1) The rights and powers of a trustee under sections 544, 545, and 549 of this title are
subject to any generally applicable law that (A) permits perfection of an interest in property to be effective against an entity that
acquired rights in such property before the date of perfection; or
(B) provides for the maintenance or continuation of perfection of an interest in the
property to be effective against an entity that acquires rights in such property before
the date on which action is taken to effect such maintenance or continuation.
(2) If(A) a law described in paragraph (1) requires seizure of such property or commencement of an action to accomplish such perfection, or maintenance or continuation of
perfection of an interest in property; and
(B) such property has not been seized or such action has not been commenced before
the date of the filing of the petition;
such interest in such property shall be perfected, or perfection of such interest shall be
maintained or continued, by giving notice within the time fixed by such law for such
seizure or such commencement. BRA § 204.
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No doubt many secured lenders will lose their perfected status because
they were unaware of this change in the Bankruptcy Code. Continuation statements may now
be filed and must now be filed during
13
bankruptcy proceedings.

1

For some creditors, ruin may be the consequence of Congress' largesse.

131. Presumably the tolling provision of Section 108(c) no longer protects creditors who
fail to timely file their continuation statements because that section is lifted "30 days after
notice of the termination or expiration of the stay under section 362 .... " If that is so,
then the perfection rights of creditors, at least versus one another if not the bankruptcy
trustee, are no longer fixed as of the petition date.

